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1 Introduction
Worldwide obesity has more than doubled since 1980 due to the increased intake of energy-
dense foods with high levels of fat, salt and sugars with low fibre and vitamins, and a decrease
in physical activity (World Health Organization (WHO)). In the US, 68% of the population
over twenty years old was overweight or obese during 2007-2008.1 In the UK, 57% of the
population over sixteen years old was overweight or obese in 2008.
Overweight and obesity represent an economic problem for governments because they can
cause negative externalities in terms of higher cost for the social security system. In the US,
the obesity-attributable medical expenditures were 9.1% of total annual medical expenditures
in 1998, and approximately one-half of these expenditures were financed by Medicare and
Medicaid (Finkelstein et al. (2003)).2 Most recently, Cawley and Meyerhoefer (2012) estimate
that 20.6% of US national health expenditures are spent treating obesity-related illness. In
the UK, the overweight and obesity attributable medical expenditures were 16.2% of the total
costs for the National Health Service (NHS) in 2006-07 (Scarborough et al. (2011)).
In order to reduce overweight and obesity, governments have responded with a variety of
interventions, including traditional public policies like product taxes (e.g. tax on sugary bev-
erages), and educational and informational programmes (e.g. promoting the advertisement of
the health consequences associated with unhealthy food consumption and adding nutritional
intake information to food packages). The US has announced new rules for school meals
in order to reduce childhood obesity; subsiding healthy meals (e.g. fruits and vegetables).3
Some European countries, like Romania, Hungary and France, are promoting taxes on un-
healthy foods.4 In addition to taxes and subsidies, currently there is a discussion on the use
of cash incentives to promote healthy behaviour both in the US (e.g. Volpp et al. (2008)) and
UK.5 This discussion has been motivated by some examples where local incentive schemes
had been piloted, including people receiving cash for losing agreed amounts of weight, and
children being rewarded with toys in exchange for eating more fruits and vegetables.
This paper aims to address the following questions: are taxes, subsidies and cash incentives
effective to reduce unhealthy food consumption? If so, which one is the most appropriate
policy to tackle the obesity problem? To answer these questions, we use a model where
1According to the WHO, a person is overweight when his Body Mass Index (BMI = Kg/m2) is greater
or equal to 25 and obese when his BMI is greater or equal to 30.
2Medicare is a social health insurance program for those aged 65 and over (or who meet other special
criteria) and Medicaid is a social health insurance program for those eligible individuals with low incomes.
Both of these programs are administered by the US government.
3The New York Times, January 25, 2012.
4See, for instance, BBC News October 01, 2011, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15137948.
5NICE Citizens Council meeting, May 20-22, 2010, www.nice.org.uk.
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consumers face an inter-temporal decision problem on the healthiness of the diet to follow.
Consumers have a trade-off between present and future utility: choosing an unhealthy diet
has the advantage that it is less expensive and more convenient than the healthy alternative;
however, whilst the healthy diet has no long term consequences in future utility, the unhealthy
diet decreases future utility as it causes the agent to be less healthy. We also consider the
existence of habit: the marginal utility from eating either healthy or unhealthy food at any
point in time depends on the consumer’s past diet.
We study the effects of three different policies on the level of unhealthy food consumption
within the population: a tax on unhealthy food, a subsidy to healthy food and cash incentives
in the form of a monetary reward to those consumers who decrease their unhealthy food
intake. We use a calibration approach to simulate the effect of these three policies in the US
and UK.
Our results suggest that cash incentives may be the most effective policy to tackle the
obesity problem as it ensures a greater reduction in the number of people with unhealthy diets.
Given the discount factor and the presence of habit, most consumers’ behaviour depends on
their initial diets. Hence, since most consumers initially choose unhealthy diets (probably
because of a failure to anticipate the long term negative effects on utility), motivating healthy
food consumption via cash incentives has a significant negative effect on the aggregate level
of unhealthy food consumption. Taxes in the form of a 10% value added tax are the least
effective policy in reducing unhealthy food consumption. Subsidies in the form of a 10% value
subsidy, on the other hand, are relatively effective in reducing unhealthy food consumption.
This is because of the differences in prices between healthy and unhealthy food; given the
low cost of unhealthy food, a percentage tax on unhealthy food has only a small effect on the
relative price difference between the two types of food whilst the same percentage applied as
a subsidy to healthy food has a much greater effect.
The comparison of the monetary benefits due to the reduction in costs for the social
security system and the implementation costs of each policy suggest that cash incentives
have very low net benefits (in most cases incentives have negative long term benefits). Thus,
cash incentives as a desirable policy depends partly on the social, non-monetary, benefits of
having a healthier population. Subsidies, on the other hand, can lead to a significant surplus
considering the savings they cause in the long term to the social security system.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Next we present the related literature.
We describe the model in Section 2 and in Section 3 we calibrate the model and simulate the
effect of the different policies on the level of unhealthy food consumption in a population.
Finally, Section 4 concludes.
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1.1 Related literature
Although there is an increasing literature studying the effect of particular policies on food
choices and body weight, only few papers tried to analyse the effectiveness of different gov-
ernment policies targeting consumers’ diets. Some papers focus on the effect of educational
information on food choices and body weight. Variyam and Cawley (2006) show that the
Nutrition Labeling and the Education Act caused a decrease in body weight and the proba-
bility of begin obese among non-Hispanic white women in US. Acs and Lyles (2007) suggest
that providing calorie information to individuals may only have small effects on food choices.
Downs et al. (2009) goes further in this line by suggesting that providing calorie information
may produce perverse effects such as promoting higher calorie consumption among dieters.
Other papers focus on taxes and subsidies: Cash et al. (2006) argue that subsidies to fruits
and vegetables (thin subsidies) encourages the consumption of healthier foods. Richards et
al. (2007) suggest that price-based policies, sin taxes, or product subsidies that change the
expected future costs and benefits of consuming carbohydrate-intensive food can be effective
in controlling excessive nutrient intake. Schroeter et al. (2008) argue that a small subsidy on
diet soft drinks would be less weight-decreasing than a tax on caloric soft drinks. Yaniv et
al. (2009) use a food-intake rational choice model to address the effect of a tax on junk food
and a subsidy on healthy meals and show that a fat tax will reduce (increase) obesity for a
non-weight-conscious (weight-conscious) individual, while a thin subsidy may increase obesity
for a non-weight-conscious individual. Fletcher et al. (2010) show that soft drink taxation,
as currently practiced in the US, leads to moderate reduction in soft drink consumption by
children and adolescents. However, according to their study the reduction in soda consump-
tion is completely offset by increases in consumption of other high-calorie drinks. Wansink
et al. (2014) provide field experiment evidence that a 10% tax on soft drinks results in small
reductions in sales of soft drinks in the first month, but there is no detectable change in such
sales after 3 months or 6 months.
Volpp et al. (2008) argue that financial incentives can be effective in inducing initial
weight loss. The authors show in an experiment that a group of obese people lost weight
after 16 weeks when given financial incentives. Nevertheless, substantial amounts of weight
were gained between the end of the weight loss phase and the follow-up three months later.
Finally, there is evidence from field experiments showing that individual incentives can im-
prove healthy consumption choices among children. Non-monetary incentives increase the
choice of fruits in comparison to cookies (List and Samek (2015a)) and the selection of white
milk relative to chocolate milk (List and Samek (2015b)) in the school lunchroom. Just and
Price (2013) provide evidence that small cash rewards have a larger effect that cash-equivalent
prizes in increasing fruit and vegetable consumption during school lunch. Similarly to previ-
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ous studies in the US, Belot et al. (2014) find that incentive schemes have a positive effect
on the consumption of fruit and vegetables in primary schools in England.
Our theoretical model builds on Becker and Murphy (1988) but focuses on the unhealthy
food consumption problem instead of any general addictive behaviour. Our model is a simpli-
fication of BM’s model where the main difference is that in our model time is discrete which
allows us to obtain a more realistic calibration and interpretation of the model.
2 The Model
We start with individual behaviour by considering the inter-temporal decision problem of a
single consumer. Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, . . . Food can be of two types:
healthy and unhealthy. We consider that unhealthy food is any food that would cause the
consumer to become overweight given her life-style. Unhealthy food includes food that is
high in fat, salt and sugar, and low in fibre and vitamins. Healthy food, on the other hand,
includes food that is low in fat, salt and sugar, and high in fibre and vitamins. We assume
that the total amount of food the consumer purchases at any given period is normalised to
one. The decision of the consumer at any given point in time is how much of unhealthy food
x ∈ [0, 1] to purchase. Denote by xt the value of x at time t. Thus, 1 − xt is the intake of
healthy food in period t. We refer to a diet as the value of x. When comparing two diets, we
say that a certain diet is healthier than another one if its amount of the unhealthy food x is
lower.6
To model the long term effects of the different diets, we assume that although both
unhealthy and healthy food are equally useful in feeding the consumer, they differ in that
the unhealthy food has a negative health effect in the future. The healthy food, on the other
hand, has no long term consequences.7 Even though unhealthy food has a negative effect in
the future, it may be attractive because it is more convenient than the alternative, healthy
food: unhealthy food may be cheaper in monetary terms (see, for instance, Monsivais (2010)),
or takes less time to cook (pre-cooked meals instead of meals cooked at home), be easier to
6Note that instead of explicitly modeling the amount of food consumed and the life-style of the individual
we summarise these two elements in the single variable x. The model abstracts food consumption in the
following way: the consumer always consumes 1 unit of food, the question is how such unit is distributed
between healthy consumption and unhealthy one. Eating healthy is interpreted as eating the right amount
of calories of food that is not negative for the health. Eating unhealthy food is interpreted as eating more
calories than needed, thus negatively affecting health in the future.
7Note that although eating healthy does not negatively affect future health, it does have long-term conse-
quences as it creates a habit for eating healthy. Eating unhealthy has two long-term consequences, it decreases
future utility and it creates a habit for eating unhealthy. We introduce the existence of habit formally later
on.
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find (fast food restaurant versus buying raw ingredients at the supermarket), or easier to
dispose of (disposable packaging as opposed to doing the dishes). All these potential effects
are introduced in the model by assuming that healthy food is more expensive than unhealthy
food.8
In the health and medical science literature whether a consumer gains (or loses) weight
is determined by what is known as the Energy Balance Equation: weight gain is equal to
the difference between energy intake and energy expenditure. Given that empirical evidence
for the US suggests that caloric expenditure has not changed significantly since 1980 while
calories consumed have risen markedly (Cutler et al. (2003)), in the model the loss of future
utility (which could be considered as a weight gain) is associated with an increase in the
consumption of unhealthy food relative to healthy food.
Each time period the consumer faces a trade-off: consuming unhealthy food is cheaper
than healthy food but it decreases future utility. We recreate this trade-off by following the
standard economic modeling approach of endowing the consumer with an utility function. In
particular, we assume that the utility function of the consumer at period t is given by
u
(
{xk}t0, 1− xt
)
= v
(
D
(
{xk}t0, 1− xt
))
+m− pxxt − p1−x(1− xt)
where {xk}t0 is the sequence of present and past consumption of unhealthy food. The function
D is an aggregation of the consumer’s present and past diet. We assume D is given recursively
by
D
(
{xk}t0, 1− xt
)
=
1− γxt + γD ({xk}t−10 , 1− xt−1)
1 + γ
.
Let x0 ∈ [0, 1] be the initial consumption of unhealthy food and D(x0, 1− x0) = 1− γx0
be the consumer’s initial diet.9 The function D is convenient for two reasons. First, it
captures the effect of past consumption of unhealthy food and the current consumption of
unhealthy food on current utility: at time t, past consumption of unhealthy food negatively
affects current utility through the term γ1+γD
({xk}t−10 , 1− xt−1). Second, D is analytically
tractable and easy to interpret: if the consumption of unhealthy food has always been x, i.e.
{xk}t0 = {x}t0, then the function D has the simple expression D
({xk}t0, 1− xt) = 1− γx.
8Although there are different ways of measuring the cost of food we follow the standard approach which
measures the price of food relative to the number of kilocalories.
9Note that if a consumer is used to eating healthy food before the policies are implemented then it will be
the case that x0 is small. This means that the consumer at time 1 has high utility from past consumption of
food (via D) and the habit of low unhealthy food consumption (via v). Similarly, a consumer that is used to
eating unhealthy before the policies are implemented will have a high x0, which translated in the model into
lower utility today and a habit of unhealthy eating.
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The function v represents the effects of a certain diet on the consumer’s utility. The
function v is differentiable with v′ > 0, v′′ > 0; hence, there is habit formation: increasing the
consumption of unhealthy food in the current period increases the future return of consuming
unhealthy food. Similarly, increasing the consumption of healthy food in the current period
increases the future return of consuming healthy food. Therefore, if a consumer increases her
current consumption of unhealthy food then she is more likely to increase it even more in
the future. The effect of a higher consumption of healthy food in the current period on the
future consumption of healthy food is analogous.
The parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] captures the effects of past consumption of unhealthy food
and also the effect of current unhealthy food consumption. The parameter γ represents
the characteristics of the consumer in terms of genetics, etc. This means that, for a given
amount of unhealthy food consumption, a consumer with a high γ derives less utility than
other consumer with a lower γ. The parameter m > 0 represents the agent’s endowment, and
px, p1−x with 0 < px < p1−x, are the prices of the unhealthy and healthy food respectively.
Each period t the consumer maximises the discounted sum of future utility by choosing
a sequence {xk}∞k=t with xk ∈ [0, 1] for all k ≥ t. If we disregard the constant terms the
consumer’s problem at time t is
max
{xk}∞k=t
∞∑
i=t
δi−t
[
v
(
D
(
{xk}i0, 1− xi
))
+ (p1−x − px)xt
]
where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor. The trade-off in the consumer’s maximisation problem
is clear: unhealthy food negatively affects consumer’s future utility through the function v,
however, it is cheaper than healthy food.
Notice that the consumer faces exactly the same problem at every t, hence it suffices to
solve it for any arbitrary period t. For notational convenience define
U t =
∞∑
i=t
δi−t
[
v
(
D
(
{xk}i0, 1− xi
))
+ (p1−x − px)xt
]
.
Notice that the strength of habits is implicit in the functional form of v. In this section we
keep a general functional form for v whilst in the next section we parametrise and calibrate
the model.
Take any arbitrary period t. Since for all {xk}t−10 it is true that D
({xk}t−10 , 1− xt−1) ∈
[0, 1] for any γ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a x¯t−1 ∈ [0, 1] such that D ({xk}t−10 , 1− xt−1) = 1 −
γx¯t−1. Notice that if past consumption has always been x, i.e. {xk}t−10 = {x}t−10 , then
D
({xk}t−10 , 1− xt−1) = 1 − γx. Hence, we can interpret x¯t−1 as the weighted average diet
the consumer has followed in the past up to t− 1.
7
Using the previous definition and disregarding the constant terms, we can rewrite the
maximisation problem at time t as
max
{xk}∞k=t
∞∑
i=t
δi−t
[
v
(
1− γxi + γ(1− γx¯i−1)
1 + γ
)
+ (p1−x − px)xt
]
. (1)
Proposition 1. Let x¯ ∈ R be such that
v
(
1 + γ (1− γx¯)
1 + γ
)
− p1−x = v
(
1− γ + γ (1− γx¯)
1 + γ
)
− px.
The diet {xk}∞k=t = {x}∞k=t that maximises the discounted sum of utility is given by
x =
{
0 if x¯t−1 < x¯ or δ is sufficiently high
1 if x¯t−1 > x¯ and δ is not sufficiently high.
Proof: see Appendix.
Proposition 1 states that a consumer would follow a healthy diet if and only if either
she is used to eating healthy or if she is patient enough with respect to future consumption.
Notice that the proposition gives no explicit equation of either x¯ or δ¯.10 These two values
depend on the specific function v and parameter values, which are computed later when we
calibrate and simulate the model.
If we define v0 = v
(
1+γ(1−γx¯)
1+γ
)
and v1 = v
(
1−γ+γ(1−γx¯)
1+γ
)
we have that the comparative
statics for the threshold x¯ are as follows:
dx¯
d(p1−x − px) =
1 + γ
γ2
1
v′0 − v′1
,
dx¯
dγ
=
1
γ2(1 + γ)
1
v′0 − v′1
(
v′1 − (v′0 − v′1)
2γ + γ2
1 + γ
x¯
)
.
That is, if the price difference between the healthy and unhealthy food decreases, the
value of x¯ increases. This, by Proposition 1, implies that a consumer is then more likely to
follow the healthy diet than the unhealthy one. This is reasonable as if the price difference
decreases then healthy food becomes more attractive for the consumer. The comparative
statics above also imply that how γ affects the threshold x¯ is ambiguous. In particular,
higher γ may decrease the threshold x¯, making a consumer more likely to continue with an
unhealthy diet. This may seem counter-intuitive at first, as more γ makes unhealthy food
more harmful in the long run. However, there is a second effect that is caused by the fact
that γ is also how past consumption aggregates into present utility. Higher γ increases the
10In principle the value of x¯ could be outside the interval [0, 1]. If x¯ < 0, the consumer follows a healthy
diet regardless of her past consumption and discount factor. On the other hand, if x¯ > 1 then whether the
consumer follows a healthy diet or not depends on her discount factor.
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effect of habit and, hence, makes it harder for a consumer to change her diet. As we shall
show in the simulations later on, it is then possible to have a non-monotonic relation between
γ and how much unhealthy food a population consumes.
Proposition 1 states that a consumer either purchases only unhealthy food or only healthy
food. This is a direct consequence of assuming that only one unit of food is consumed per
period and that v′′ > 0. This dichotomous result poses no problem for interpreting the model,
rather the opposite, it makes interpretation easier and will allow us in the next section to
classify the population between two groups with different eating habits. The link between
the healthiness of the diet chosen by the consumer and her weight in this framework is as
follows. When the consumer chooses to eat unhealthy (x = 1) we consider she is overweight.
On the other hand, when the consumer chooses to eat healthy (x = 0) she is not overweight.
This simplifies the interpretation in our model when we introduce a population of consumers
(next section), so different agents will choose different diets with x ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore, on
aggregate a certain percentage of the population will eat unhealthy and be overweight, and
the rest of the population will eat healthy and not be overweight.
3 Policy Discussion
In order to study the effect of different policies on the unhealthy food consumption in a pop-
ulation, we assume that consumers differ in their parameter γ, which captures characteristics
such as lifestyle, genetics, peer effect, etc. Hence, γ can be related to how individuals are
concerned with their well being and how they look, whether they exercise regularly or not,
how they deal with the consumption of unhealthy food or whether historically they have been
more included towards healthier foods. In order to simplify the calculations we keep constant
across agents the discount factor δ and the functional form of v.
The three policies we consider in this paper are a tax, a subsidy and cash incentives. A
tax is represented in the model by an increase in the price of unhealthy food from px to
px(1 + t), where t is the size of the tax. Similarly, a subsidy is represented by a decrease
in the price of healthy food from p1−x to p1−x(1 − s), where s is the size of the subsidy.
Finally, cash incentives consists of a monetary reward of I whenever the individual consumes
healthy food. That is, with cash incentives we add to the utility of the consumer, U t, the
term
∑∞
i=t δ
i−t1xtI where 1xt equals 1 if xt = 0 and 0 otherwise.
All three policies can reduce the population’s consumption of unhealthy food and, there-
fore, they may have a permanent effect even if the policy is applied only temporarily. This
can happen because by changing the optimal decision of a consumer at a certain point in
time her habits changed, hence it is possible to also affect her future decisions. More specif-
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ically, consider a consumer who finds it is optimal to choose the unhealthy diet. Therefore,
by proposition 1 we must have that x¯t−1 > x¯. When policy P ∈ {t, s, I} is implemented,
if we let x¯(P ) be the value of x¯ in proposition 1 when such policy is introduced, then given
that v′, v′′ > 0 we have x¯(t), x¯(s), x¯(I) < x¯. Therefore, we could have that x¯t−1 < x¯(P ) with
P ∈ {t, s, I} and the consumer chooses the healthy diet when a policy is introduced. If this
happens, then it is possible that a consumer moves from a situation where x¯t−1 > x¯ to a
situation where x¯T+t−1 < x¯ after the policy P has been in place for T periods. From time
T + t on, the consumer follows the healthy diet even if the policy is removed.
Note that both taxes and subsidies affect the consumer incentives in the same way. This
is because they both narrow the price difference between unhealthy and healthy food, and
both these prices enter linearly in the utility function of the consumer. This does not mean
that the tax and the subsidy will have the same effects on the consumer, as they are both
applied to different prices.
3.1 Calibration
To calibrate the model and simulate the effects of the three different policies for the US
and the UK, we assume that the population is such that γ, the parameter that represents
individual characteristics, follows a normal distribution truncated between 0 and 1. We write
this as γ ∼ N[0,1](µ, σ2), where µ is the mean and σ2 is the variance. We set σ2 = 0.1 and
consider three different possible values for the mean, µ ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}.11
The initial consumption of unhealthy food, x0, is random and equal to either 0 or 1. We
use a Bernoulli distribution and set at random x0 = 1 for 68% of the population and x0 = 0
for 32% of the population in the case of the US, and x0 = 1 for 57% of the population and
x0 = 0 for 43% of the population in the case of the UK. These values correspond to the WHO
estimates whereby 68% of the US population and 57% of the UK population is overweight.12
Each time period is set equal to a quarter and the discount factor is assumed to take the
value δ = 0.987. Given that each time period represents a quarter, we have that 0.9874 =
0.949, which is in line with current studies where the annual discount rate is found to be
around 0.95 (see for instance Laibson et al. (2008)).
Since each time period is a quarter, the prices px and p1−x represent the quarterly spending
on unhealthy and healthy food respectively. If a proportion y of the population is overweight
11Simulations show that the qualitative results are robust to different values of σ.
12We remind the reader that according to the WHO a person is overweight if her BMI is equal or above
25. Note that obese people (BMI ≥ 30) are also overweight.
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and e is the quarterly expenditure on food of an average consumer we have that
e = ypx + (1− y)p1−x.
Monsivais et al. (2010) estimate that the ratio between the price of healthy food and
unhealthy food is between 1 and 8.3, depending on the nutrient density of the food under
consideration. Using the fact that in our model all consumers purchase the same amount of
food per period we focus on an intermediate value for this ratio and set 4.5px = p1−x. Thus,
px =
e
y + 4.5(1− y) . (2)
For the US, using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics13 we obtain that e = $1, 610.75.
According to the WHO the proportion of overweight people in the US is y = 0.68. Hence,
if we harmonise to 2010 US dollars14, we have that px(US) = $769.50 and p1−x(US) =
$3, 462.76.
For the UK, the quarterly food spending is £659.10.15 According to the WHO the pro-
portion of overweight people in the UK is y = 0.57. Hence, if we harmonise to 2010 British
pounds16, we have that px(UK) = £277.65 and p1−x(UK) = £1, 249.41.
We assume the function v to be such that
v (D) = N(Dn)
where the exponent n > 1 and the scaling factor N > 0 are free parameters and their values
are set to match the data of the country under consideration. In particular, we are looking at
values of n and N such that two conditions are satisfied. First, in the absence of any policy
the percentage of consumers choosing the unhealthy diet equals 68% for the US and 57% for
the UK. Second, amongst these consumers whose optimal consumption can be changed from
the unhealthy diet to the healthy one, i.e. consume x = 1 but would consume x = 0 if their
diet had been healthy in the past (x0 = 0), the maximum number of quarters needed for such
a change is six (a year and a half). We have found no empirical reference for the average time
it takes for an overweight person to achieve a BMI below 25. Nevertheless, medical literature
suggests that a key challenge in weight loss interventions is to both attain initial weight loss
and to maintain that weight loss over periods of 12 months or more (Volpp et al. (2008)).
Using the values of δ, px, p1−x and the distribution γ ∼ N[0,1](µ, σ2) with σ2 = 0.1 and
µ ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}, we find that a habit parameter of n = 50 and scaling factors of N = 2740
13Consumer Expenditures in 2008, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
14CPI index, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
15Living Costs and Food Survey 2008, Office for National Statistics.
16CPI index, Office for National Statistics.
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for the US and N = 990 for the UK fulfil our two desired requirements.17 Notice that
the calibrated habit parameter, n = 50, is in line with the literature supporting addiction to
calories from food. Indeed, Richards et al. (2007) show empirical evidence of strong addiction
to carbohydrates, Liu and Lopez (2012) provide evidence that carbonated soft drinks are
rationally addictive, and List and Samek (2015a) provide field experiment evidence of habit
formation in children healthy food consumption.
With respect to the different policies, we consider the value of the tax and the subsidy
fixed at 10%. This value is greater than the 1.5% to 7.25% soft drink and snack food tax
applied in different US states (Jacobson and Brownell (2000)). We choose a higher tax (and
subsidy) given that, as argued by Jacobson and Brownell (2000), current tax levels are too
small to affect unhealthy food consumption. Moreover, Wansink et al. (2014) also use a 10%
tax on soft drinks in their field experiment.
When considering cash incentives, we assume that the amount of money given to each
consumer per quarter equals to the difference between the quarterly cost of consuming healthy
food and the quarterly cost of consuming unhealthy food. This ensures that all consumers
find it optimal to follow a healthy diet for at least as long as the policy lasts. Given the
numerical values derived above, we have that the quarterly amount of cash given must equal
$2, 693.26 in case of the US and £971.76 in case of the UK. We could assume instead that
each consumer receives exactly the amount of cash needed to have the healthy diet as optimal
choice. However, this poses a problem from the applied policy point of view because it may
not be possible or feasible to discriminate amongst consumers.
The costs of implementing each policy are calculated as follows. We assume that taxing
unhealthy food has no implementation costs.18 The cost of implementing the subsidy is
given by the amount of the subsidy itself. The cost of implementing cash incentives equals
the amount of cash to be given per quarter to each consumer times the number of quarters
needed to change the habits of the consumer being targeted. We assume that cash incentives
are given only to those consumers who can successfully change their unhealthy habits.
The benefit of each policy is calculated by looking at the expense that does not occur
if a particular policy is implemented (avoidable costs). In our model, the avoidable cost is
the money that the social security system saves because of the reduction in the number of
overweight people. In the case of a tax, in addition to the avoidable costs the revenue from
the tax is also considered as a benefit.
17We stress here that neither N nor the strength of the habit parameter n are chosen freely, their values
are calibrated using the data described above.
18This assumption is made to simplify the analysis. Moreover, we have found no empirical evidence on the
implementation cost of unhealthy food taxation.
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Note that each policy changes the utility of the population. In case of subsidies and cash
incentives, this change is positive while in the case of taxes this change could potentially be
negative. We have chosen not to consider the changes in utility as a benefit/cost for the
society for several reasons. First, we would be adding utility to money, which makes no sense
from the methodological point of view even though the utility function assumed is quasi-linear
in wealth. Second, we would need to aggregate the utilities of different consumers. Finally
and most importantly, we want to take the conservative approach of focusing only on the
monetary benefits of each policy.
To calculate the amount of money the social security system saves per overweight patient
we proceed as follows. The total saving per overweight patient is equal to the total cost per
overweight patient (avoidable cost). The total cost per overweight patient is equal to the cost
per overweight patient per year times the number of years each overweight patient receives
medical treatment. By total cost per overweight patient we mean the additional cost that an
overweight patient imposes on the social security system when compared to a non-overweight
patient.
In the US, the cost to Medicare per overweight patient per year is, on average, $600.00
extra when compared to a non-overweight patient (Finkelstein et al. (2009)).19 We consider
that patients receive treatment at Medicare for two years.20 Thus, if we harmonize to 2010
US dollars and assume an annual interest rate of 3%, then each overweight person costs
Medicare on average $1, 768.87.
In the UK, there is no evidence of the additional cost to the NHS of an overweight patient
compared to a normal weight patient. The approach we take is to calculate the additional cost
of an overweight patient for the NHS as the ratio between the total overweight cost and the
number of overweight patients for the NHS. Since we do not have information on the number
of overweight patients at the NHS we use instead the same proportion of enrollment/total
population as in the US: 14.85%.21 The costs to the NHS attributable to overweight patients
equals £5, 146 million per year22 and the assumed number of enrollment in the NHS in the
UK in 2008 is 9, 117, 603. Therefore, the cost per overweight patient is £564.40 per year. We
also assume that overweight patients receive medical treatment during two years in the NHS.
Thus, if we harmonize to 2010 British pounds and assume an annual interest rate of 3% each
19Measured in 2008 US dollars. We found no data on overweight only patients (BMI between 25 and 30).
20Simulation results show that our qualitative results still hold for alternative time periods. In particular,
we also considered a situation where patients receive treatment at enter Medicare at the age of 65 and live for
an average of 77 years minus 3 years for being overweight (Moderate Obesity Takes Years Off Life Expectancy,
University of Oxford (2009, March 20)) and found the same qualitative results.
21This is a sensible assumption given that all UK residents have the right to NHS treatment.
22Measured in 2007 British pounds (Scarborough et al. (2011)).
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overweight person costs the NHS on average £1, 796.31.
Altogether, then, the key features of the calibration can be summarised as in table 1.
Table 1: Calibration
γ ∼ N[0,1](µ, σ2)
µ ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}
σ2 0.1
t quarter
x0 Bernoulli(0.68) (US), Bernoulli(0.57) (UK)
δ 0.987
px $769.50 (US), £277.65 (UK)
p1−x $3, 462.76 (US), £1, 249.41 (UK)
v (D) N(Dn)
N 2740 (US), 990 (UK)
n 50
tax 10%
subsidy 10%
cash incentives $2, 693.26 (US), £971.76 (UK)
S.S. costs per overweight $1, 768.87 (US), £1, 796.31 (UK)
3.2 Numerical Results
We simulate the model for both the US and the UK and the three different policies for a
population of 100 consumers and then scale up the results to a population of 304.37 million
in the case of the US and a population of 61.40 million in the case of the UK.23 We proceed
in this way so simulating the model is computationally more convenient.24
Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the simulations of our model given the calibration just
described. By looking at both tables, we can conclude that:
1. Cash incentives is the most effective policy in reducing unhealthy food consumption.
2. However, cash incentives is the least profitable policy and can lead to significant mon-
etary costs.
23Population in 2008, US Census Bureau (US) and Office for National Statistics (UK).
24The qualitative results are similar if we simulate the model for a population of 1,000 consumers and then
scale up the results to the target population.
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3. A 10% tax is relatively ineffective in reducing unhealthy food consumption.
4. A 10% subsidy is the most profitable policy and relatively effective in reducing unhealthy
food consumption.
Table 2: Policy Comparison (US)
µ = 0 µ = 0.5 µ = 1
Overweight no policy (%) 68 68 68
Tax
Overweight with policy (%) 36 57 68
Revenue 1,252 1,983 2,365
Benefit 25,345 8,795 0
Benefit + Revenue 26,597 10,777 2,365
Subsidy
Overweight with policy (%) 13 8 18
Subsidies 13,617 14,400 12,834
Benefit 43,814 47,972 39,977
Benefit - Cost 30,197 33,572 27,142
Cash Incentives
Overweight with policy (%) 21 1 1
Periods needed p.p. (average) 1.77 3.33 4.75
Cost 100,613 271,413 387,121
Benefit 37,418 53,569 53,569
Benefit - Cost -63,195 -217,905 -333,552
2010 million US dollars unless stated otherwise. Revenue: Money
collected from the tax. Benefit: Avoidable cost to Medicare.
Subsidies: Expense for subsidising healthy food. Periods needed
p.p. (average): Average number of periods per person during
which beneficiaries of cash incentives receive the monetary pay-
ment. Cost: Total amount of money given to beneficiaries of cash
incentives.
Cash incentives is the most effective policy to reduce the number of people with unhealthy
diets. This result is due to the fact that, given the discount factor and the presence of habit,
most consumers’ behaviour depend on their initial diets. Moreover, the amount of cash
incentives is such that those consumers with unhealthy habit find it is optimal to change to
the healthy diet (at least) during when the policy is implemented. Hence, given the amount of
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Table 3: Policy Comparison (UK)
µ = 0 µ = 0.5 µ = 1
Overweight no policy (%) 57 57 57
Tax
Overweight with policy (%) 34 48 57
Revenue 86 122 144
Benefit 3,767 1,474 0
Benefit + Revenue 3,853 1,596 144
Subsidy
Overweight with policy (%) 13 7 18
Subsidies 991 1,059 934
Benefit 7,206 8,189 6,387
Benefit - Subsidies 6,215 7,130 5,453
Cash Incentives
Overweight with policy (%) 21 1 1
Periods needed p.p. (average) 1.89 3.00 4.74
Cost 6,035 14,885 23,503
Benefit 5,896 9,172 9,172
Benefit - Cost -138 -5,713 -14,331
2010 million pounds unless stated otherwise. Revenue: Money
collected from the tax. Benefit: Avoidable cost to NHS. Sub-
sidies: Expense for subsidising healthy food. Periods needed
p.p. (average): Average number of periods per person dur-
ing which beneficiaries of cash incentives receive the monetary
payment. Cost: Total amount of money given to beneficiaries
of cash incentives.
cash incentives and that most consumers initially choose unhealthy diets, motivating healthy
food consumption via cash incentives reduces significantly the aggregate level of unhealthy
food consumption. Cash incentives, however, are relatively costly and can lead to significant
monetary costs.
The reason behind the ineffectiveness of a tax is because, given the differences in prices
between healthy and unhealthy food, a 10% change in the cost of unhealthy food has a small
absolute effect. To illustrate this point, note that a 10% tax increases the quarterly cost of
unhealthy food by $76.95 in the US and £27.77 in the UK, while a 10% subsidy reduces the
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quarterly cost of healthy food by $346.28 in the US and £124.94 in the UK.
Notice that although higher values of µ imply higher long term loss in utility from eating
unhealthy food, higher values of µ also make it harder to change from an unhealthy diet to
a healthy one. This is the reason why there is a non-monotonic relation between µ and the
total consumption of unhealthy food when subsidies are considered. We not always observe
such non-monotonicity when the tax is considered because, as already argued, its absolute
effect is lower than that of the subsidy.
We acknowledge the limitations of our study. It considers a linear relationship between
caloric intake and weight, which can lead to an overestimation in the amount of weight
lost compared with a non-linear relationship between caloric intake and weight. Another
limitation is due to the fact that we considered only two types of food, so our model leaves out
more complex substitution patterns across food types. Nevertheless, our focus is on whether
and to which extent the three policies are effective in reducing unhealthy food consumption
in the population.
However, the qualitative results still hold if we consider alternative modifications in the
calibration procedure. Previous results are based on overweight people (BMI equal or above
25), and the first modification was to calibrate and simulate the model with only obese people
(BMI equal or above 30) and the results of such calibration (Appendix B) enforces the idea
that subsidies seem the best alternative to tackle the obesity problem. The main results for
the US are based on the extra cost for Medicare of 600 (in 2008 US dollars) for an overweight
patient per year compared to a non-overweight patient (Finkelstein et al. (2009)). We also
calibrated and simulated the model with the alternative extra medical care cost of $2, 418 (in
2005 US dollars) estimated by Cawley and Meyerhoefer (2012), and the results also suggest
that subsidies are the most cost-effective policy (Appendix C). Finally, in order to analyse
the duration of the cash incentives we have run numerical simulations where the maximum
number of quarters needed for changing the consumer’s habits is either five or seven and
found that results are very similar to those obtained when such number equals six. However,
the effectiveness of cash incentives seems to depend slightly negatively on the number of
quarters considered. Details of this extension are available from the authors upon request.
4 Concluding remarks
To handle the obesity problem, governments have responded with a variety of interventions,
including product taxes, banning private advertising of foods that are high in fat, salt and
sugar, and promoting advertising of the consequences of unhealthy food consumption. Most
recently, the US has implemented healthy meal subsidies to reduce child obesity and there
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is an ongoing discussion on the use of cash incentives to promote healthy behaviour both in
the US and UK. Within this context, we studied whether taxes, subsidies or cash incentives
are effective to reduce unhealthy food consumption and, if so, which is the most appropriate
policy to tackle the obesity problem.
Our results suggest that cash incentives can be the most effective policy in reducing
unhealthy food consumption. Taxes, on the contrary, are relatively ineffective in reducing
unhealthy food consumption. The comparison of the monetary benefits due to the reduction
in costs for the social security system and the implementation costs of each policy suggest
that cash incentives can lead to significant monetary losses. Finally, we found that subsidies
have the best balance between effectiveness in reducing unhealthy food consumption and
monetary benefits to the society.
This paper contributes to the economic analysis of unhealthy food consumption and to
the public debate on how to tackle the obesity problem. We built, calibrated and simulated
a theoretical model to US and UK data, thus quantifying the effects of the different policies.
There are several issues left for possible future research, for instance considering hyperbolic
discounting or assuming a non-separable utility function. Nevertheless, this paper sheds new
light on the issue of how to tackle the obesity problem by suggesting subsides rather than
taxes or cash incentives, as a potential solution.
References
[1] Acs, Z. J., and Lyles, A. (2007). ‘Obesity, Business and Public Policy’. Edward Elgar
Publishing Ltd.
[2] Becker, G. S., and Murphy, K. M. (1988). ‘A Theory of Rational Addiction’, Journal of
Political Economy, 98, 675-700.
[3] Belot, M., James, J., and Nolen, P. J. (2014). ‘Incentives and Childrens’s Dietary Choices:
A Field Experiment in Primary Schools’, working paper.
[4] Cash, S. B., Sunding, D. L., and Zilberman, D. (2006). ‘Fat Taxes and Thin Subsidies:
Prices, Diet, and Health Outcomes’, Acta Agriculturae Scand C: Food Economics (special
issue on the economics and policy of diet and health) 2, 167-174.
[5] Cawley, J., and Meyerhoefer, C. (2012). ‘The Medical Care Costs of Obesity: An Instru-
mental Variables Approach’, Journal of Health Economics, 31, 219-230.
[6] Cutler, D. M., Glaeser, E. L., and Shapiro, J. M. (2003). ‘Why Have Americans Become
More Obese?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17 (3), 93-118.
18
[7] Downs J., G. Loewenstein, and Wisdom, J. (2009). ‘Strategies for Promoting Healthier
Food Choices’, The American Economic Review, 99, 159-164.
[8] Finkelstein, E. A., Fiebelkorn, I. C., and Wang, G. (2003). ‘National Medical Spend-
ing Attributable To Overweight And Obesity: How Much, And Who’s Paying?’, Health
Affairs W3, 219-226.
[9] Finkelstein, E. A., Trogdon, J. G., Cohen, J. W., and Dietz, W. (2009). ‘Annual Medical
Spending Attributable To Obesity: Payer-And Service-Specific Estimates’, Health Affairs,
822-831.
[10] Fletcher, J. M., Frisvold, D. E., and Tefft, N. (2010). ‘The Effects of Soft Drink Taxes on
Child and Adolescent Consumption and Weight Outcomes’, Journal of Public Economics,
94, 967-974.
[11] Jacobson, M. F., and Brownell, K. D. (2000). ‘Small Taxes on Soft Drinks and Snack
Food to Promote Health’, American Journal of Public Health, 90 (6), 854-857.
[12] Just, D. R., and Price, J. (2013). ‘Using incentives to encourage healthy eating in chil-
dren’, Journal of Human Resources, 48 (4), 855-872.
[13] Laibson, D., Repetto, A., and Tobacman, J. (2008). ‘Estimating Discount Functions
with Consumption Choices over the Lifecycle’, NBER working paper.
[14] List, J. A., and Samek, A. S.(2015a). ‘The behavioralist as nutritionist: Leveraging
behavioral economics to improve child food choice and consumption’, Journal of health
economics, 39, 135-146.
[15] List, J. A., and Samek, A. S.(2015b). ‘A Field Experiment on the Impact of Incentives
on Milk Choice in the Lunchroom’, forthcoming in Public Finance Review.
[16] Liu, L., and Lopez, R. (2012). ‘Evidence of Rational Addiction to Carbonated Soft
Drinks’, China Agricultural Economic Review, 4(3), 300-317.
[17] Monsivais P., Mclain, J., and Drewnowski, A. (2010). ‘The rising disparity in the price
of healthful foods: 20042008’, Food Policy, 35, 514-520.
[18] Richards, T. J., Matterson, P. M., and Tegene, A. (2007). Obesity and nutrient con-
sumption: a rational addiction? Contemporary Economic Policy, 25, 309-324.
[19] Scarborough, P., Bhatnagar, P., Wickramasinghe, K., Allender, S., Foster, C., and
Rayner, M. (2011). ‘The Economic Burden of Ill Health due to Diet, Physical Inactivity,
Smoking, Alcohol and Obesity in the UK: an Update to 2006-07 NHS Costs’, Journal of
Public Health, May, 1-9.
19
[20] Schroeter, C., Lusk, J., and Tyner, W. (2008). ‘Determining the impact of food price
and income changes on body weight’, Journal of Health Economics, 27, 45-68.
[21] Variyam, J., and Cawley, J. (2006). ‘Nutrition labels and obesity’, NBER Working Paper
No. w11956.
[22] Volpp, K. G., John, L. K., Troxel, A. B., Norton, L., Fassbender, J., and Loewenstein,
G. (2008). ‘Financial Incentive-Based Approaches for Weight Loss’, The Journal of the
American Medical Association, 300, 2631-2637.
[23] Wansink, B., Hanks, A. S., and Just, D. R. (2014). ‘From coke to coors: a field study of
a fat tax and its unintended consequences’, SSNR working paper.
[24] Yaniv, G., Rosin, O., and Tobol, Y. (2009). ‘Junk-Food, Home cooking, Physical Ac-
tivity and Obesity: The Effect of the Fat Tax and the Thin Subsidy’, Journal of Public
Economics, 93, 823-830.
A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. If we take the partial derivatives at time t with respect to xk with k ≥ t in equation
(1) we obtain
∂U t
∂xk
= −
∞∑
i=k
δi−t
[(
γ
1 + γ
)i−k+1
v′
(
1− γxi + γ(1− γx¯i−1)
1 + γ
)]
+ δk−t (p1−x − px) (3)
where v′ is the derivative of v with respect to D at time i. If we now compute the second
partial derivatives we have
∂2U t
∂2xk
=
∞∑
i=k
δi−t
(
γ
1 + γ
)i−k+2
v′′
(
1− γxt + γ(1− γx¯t−1)
1 + γ
)
.
As v′′ > 0 implies ∂
2Ut
∂2xk
> 0 the optimal sequence {xk}∞k=t has xk ∈ {0, 1} for all k =
t, . . . ,∞. Moreover, if at the optimum xt = 1 then it must be that
∞∑
i=t
δi−t
[
v
(
1− γ + γ(1− γx¯i−1)
1 + γ
)
− px
]
>
∞∑
i=t
δi−t
[
v
(
1 + γ(1− γx¯i−1)
1 + γ
)
− p1−x
]
.
Thus, since v′′ > 0 and xt = 1 implies x¯t > x¯t−1, we must have that
∞∑
i=t+1
δi−t
[
v
(
1− γ + γ(1− γx¯i−1)
1 + γ
)
− px
]
>
∞∑
i=t+1
δi−t
[
v
(
1 + γ(1− γx¯i−1)
1 + γ
)
− p1−x
]
.
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Hence, if at the optimum xt = 1 then at the optimum xt+1 = 1. Iterating on this reasoning
we can conclude that if at the optimum xt = 1 then it must be that at the optimum xk = 1
for all k = t, . . . ,∞. Using similar steps, it can be shown that if at the optimum xt = 0 then
the optimum has xk = 0 for all k = t, . . . ,∞. Therefore, the optimal sequence of unhealthy
food consumption is such that {xk}∞k=t = {x}∞k=t with x ∈ {0, 1}.
If x¯t−1 < x¯ then given that v′ > 0 and v′′ > 0 it is true that v
(
1+γ(1−γx¯t−1)
1+γ
)
− p1−x >
v
(
1−γ+γ(1−γx¯t−1)
1+γ
)
−px. This implies that the consumer derives maximum one period utility
if she consumes x = 0 at time t. Furthermore, for all two sequences {xk}T0 and {xk
′}T0 with
T > t that are different only in that xt = 0 and xt
′
> 0, we have that v
(
D
({xk}T0 , 1− xT )) >
v
(
D
(
{xk′}T0 , 1− xT
))
. Thus, if x¯t−1 < x¯ then the optimum has xk = 0 for all k ≥ t.
If x¯t−1 > x¯ then by similar arguments as those used above, the consumer derives maximum
one period utility if she consumes x = 1 at time t. However, it is still true that for all two
sequences {xk}T0 and {xk
′}T0 with T > t that are different only in that xt = 0 and xt
′
> 0, we
have that v
(
D
({xk}T0 , 1− xT )) > v (D ({xk′}T0 , 1− xT)). Hence, although the consumer
derives more one period utility at time t if she consumes xt = 1, if δ is high enough the gain
in utility from consuming xt = 1 instead of xt = 0 does not offset the long term loss in utility.
In this case we have that there exists a threshold value δ¯ such that if δ < δ¯ then the optimal
diet is xk = 0 for all k ≥ t whilst if δ > δ¯ then the optimal diet is xk = 1 for all k ≥ t.
B Obese Population
A reasonable question is whether we obtain the same results when only obese people are
considered. That is, if we regard consumers whose BMI is between 25 and 30 as not following
an unhealthy diet. This is the object of study in this subsection.
The parameters γ, µ, σ2, t and δ are set to the same values as the ones used in the
previous calibration. According to the WHO, 34% of the US population and 21% of the UK
population is obese. According to this information we set at random x0 = 1 for 34% of the
population and x0 = 0 for 66% of the population in the case of the US, and x0 = 1 for 21%
of the population and x0 = 0 for 79% of the population in the case of the UK.
Using equation (2), the fact that e = $1, 610.75 for the US and £659.10 for the UK,
and y = 0.34 for the US and y = 0.21 for the UK, we obtain that px(US) = $491.81
and p1−x(US) = $2, 213.16, and px(UK) = £184.73 and p1−x(UK) = £831.28 (all values
harmonised to 2010 prices). Note that in this case px and p1−x represent the quarterly costs
of following a diet that will lead to a person being obese and the quarterly costs of following
a diet that would lead to a person not being obese, respectively.
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As in subsection 3.1, values of n andN are identified such that the percentage of consumers
choosing the unhealthy diet equals 34% for the US and 21% for the UK, and the maximum
number of quarters needed for a consumer to change her habits equals six. Using the values
of δ, px, p1−x and the distribution γ ∼ N[0,1](µ, σ2), a habit parameter of n = 50 and scaling
factors of N = 1770 for the US and N = 668 for the UK fulfill the two requirements.
With respect to the different policies under analysis, the same values are used as those
employed in the previous calibration except for cash incentives. Given the numerical values
derived above, the quarterly amount of cash given must equal $1, 721.35 in case of the US
and £646.55 in the case of the UK. Note that we assume each obese consumer costs the social
security system the same as the value used in the previous calibration.
The calibration when only obese consumers are considered is presented in table 4.
Table 4: Calibration, Obese Only
γ ∼ N[0,1](µ, σ2)
µ ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}
σ2 0.1
t quarter
x0 0.34 (US), 0.21 (UK)
δ 0.987
px $491.81 (US), £184.73 (UK)
p1−x $2, 213.16 (US), £831.28 (UK)
v (D) N(Dn)
N 1, 770 (US), 668 (UK)
n 50
tax 10%
subsidy 10%
cash incentives $1, 721.35 (US), £646.55 (UK)
As before, we simulate the model and the three different policies for a population of 100
consumers and then scale up the results to a population of 304.37 million in the case of the US
and 61.40 million in the case of the UK.25 Tables 5 and 6 show the results of the simulations.
The calibration and simulation of the model when only obese consumers are considered
also suggest that subsidies seem the best alternative to solve the obesity problem.
25We obtained similar qualitative results by simulating the model for a population of 1,000 consumers and
then scale up the results to the target population.
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Table 5: Policy Comparison (US), Obese Only
µ = 0 µ = 0.5 µ = 1
Obese no policy (%) 34 34 34
Tax
Obese with policy (%) 21 28 32
Revenue 467 622 711
Benefit 10,394 4,797 1,599
Benefit + Revenue 10,861 5,420 2,310
Subsidy
Obese with policy (%) 7 2 3
Subsidies 9,303 9,803 9,703
Benefit 21,587 25,585 24,785
Benefit - Subsidies 12,284 15,782 15,082
Cash Incentives
Obese with policy (%) 13 5 1
Periods needed p.p. (average) 1.62 3.00 4.03
Cost 26,453 67,690 103,480
Benefit 16,790 23,186 26,385
Benefit - Cost -9,663 -44,504 -77,096
2010 million US dollars unless stated otherwise. Revenue:
Money collected from the tax. Benefit: Avoidable cost to Medi-
care. Subsidies: Expense for subsidising healthy food. Periods
needed p.p. (average): Average number of periods per person
during which beneficiaries of cash incentives receive the mone-
tary payment. Cost: Total amount of money given to benefi-
ciaries of cash incentives.
C Alternative Social Security Costs (US)
In a recent paper Cawley and Meyerhoefer (2012) provide an alternative measure of the
marginal effect of obesity on medical care costs. They find that an obese person raises medical
expenditures paid by third parties by $2, 418 (in 2005 US dollars) relative to a non-obese
person. Cawley and Meyerhoefer suggest that previous literature has underestimated the
medical costs of obesity and, therefore, the economic rationale for government intervention
to reduce obesity-related externalities. Table 7 shows the result of the simulations of our
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Table 6: Policy Comparison (UK), Obese Only
µ = 0 µ = 0.5 µ = 1
Obese no policy (%) 21 21 21
Tax
Obese with policy (%) 13 19 21
Revenue 22 32 35
Benefit 1,310 328 0
Benefit + Revenue 1,332 359 35
Subsidy
Obese with policy (%) 5 2 1
Subsidies 720 743 750
Benefit 2,620 3,112 3,276
Benefit - Subsidies 1,900 2,369 2,525
Cash Incentives
Obese with policy (%) 15 5 1
Periods needed p.p. (average) 1.67 3.06 3.95
Cost 590 2,889 4,657
Benefit 983 2,620 3,276
Benefit - Cost 393 -268 -1,381
2010 million pounds unless stated otherwise. Revenue:
Money collected from the tax. Benefit: Avoidable cost to
NHS. Subsidies: Expense for subsidising healthy food. Peri-
ods needed p.p. (average): Average number of periods per
person during which beneficiaries of cash incentives receive
the monetary payment. Cost: Total amount of money given
to beneficiaries of cash incentives.
model considering the alternative obesity cost estimated by Cawley and Meyerhoefer (2012).
As it can be seen in table 7, most of our previous conclusions are still valid. The only
difference is that with higher costs per obese person cash incentives no longer lead to a
deficit in the social security budget. This is simply caused by the fact that now the benefits
of reducing obesity are more acute. Nevertheless, we still find that subsidies are the most
cost-effective policy.
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Table 7: Policy Comparison (US), Obese Only - alternative
cost
µ = 0 µ = 0.5 µ = 1
Obese no policy (%) 34 34 34
Tax
Obese with policy (%) 21 28 32
Revenue 467 622 711
Benefit 53,969 24,909 8,303
Benefit + Revenue 54,436 25,531 9,014
Subsidy
Obese with policy (%) 7 2 3
Subsidies 9,303 9,803 9,703
Benefit 112,090 132,848 128,696
Benefit - Subsidies 102,787 123,044 118,993
Cash Incentives
Obese with policy (%) 13 5 1
Periods needed p.p. (average) 1.62 3.00 4.03
Cost 26,453 67,690 103,480
Benefit 87,181 120,393 136,999
Benefit - Cost 60,728 52,703 33,519
2010 million US dollars unless stated otherwise. Revenue: Money
collected from the tax. Benefit: Avoidable cost to Medicare. Sub-
sidies: Expense for subsidising healthy food. Periods needed p.p.
(average): Average number of periods per person during which
beneficiaries of cash incentives receive the monetary payment.
Cost: Total amount of money given to beneficiaries of cash in-
centives.
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